A guided story
You will see why changing Q (quantity in the box) can mimic a price change, and when a
firm prefers "Shrink Ray" (smaller quantity) versus "20% Free" (larger quantity).
1) What changes when the sticker price stays the same?
Imagine a product that usually costs P dollars. One day the sticker price is unchanged,
but the amount inside the package is different.
Holding P fixed and changing Q changes the unit price
P / Q. Some shoppers notice unit price changes; others mostly do not.
Why not just change the sticker price?
In many retail settings, changing shelf prices is costly (menu costs), and consumers can be more sensitive to sticker price changes than quantity changes. That makes quantity an attractive "quiet" lever for firms.
2) Two kinds of shoppers
The model is built around a simple behavioral split:
- Informed shoppers look at unit price and compare
P / Qto their value per gram. - Uninformed shoppers mostly respond to the sticker price
P, unless the quantity drop is obvious.
In the interactive model, values are "willingness to pay": how much someone personally thinks the product is worth.
Math details (optional)
Informed buys if: V_i >= P/Q
Uninformed buys if: V_u >= P and (optionally) Q > Q*
3) From people to demand
A single person is unpredictable, but a crowd becomes predictable if you assume a distribution of values. The paper uses a uniform distribution to get clean closed-form equations.
Here V_I and V_U are the maximum possible values in each group. Bigger maxima mean
more people are willing to buy.
Math details (optional)
Assume: V_i ~ Uniform[0, V_I] and V_u ~ Uniform[0, V_U]
D_i(Q) = max(0, 1 - P/(Q * V_I))
D_u(P) = max(0, 1 - P/V_U)
Total demand = alpha * D_i(Q) + (1 - alpha) * D_u(P)
(In strict mode, D_u is multiplied by 1{Q > Q*}.)
4) Profit and regimes
The firm's margin per sold box is P - C*Q. Lowering Q reduces cost (good) but raises unit price (bad for informed demand).
-
Shrink Ray regime:
Qis low enough that informed demand collapses, so profit comes mostly from uninformed buyers. -
Normal regime:
Qis high enough that informed buyers still participate, which pushes the firm toward a larger quantity.
Math details (optional)
Margin per box: (P - C*Q)
Expected profit per customer:
pi(Q) = (P - C*Q) * [ alpha*D_i(Q) + (1-alpha)*D_u(P) ]
The simulation tab computes analytic expectations from these equations, then runs a Monte Carlo simulation to show how close the sampled outcome is.
5) Try Shrink Ray vs 20% Free
Both tactics can use the same packaging: the firm changes how much product is inside while keeping the sticker price the same.
- Shrink Ray: decrease
Q-> unit price goes up -> informed buyers are the first to leave. - 20% Free: increase
Q-> unit price goes down -> informed buyers are more likely to buy.
- Open the simulation.
- Pick a scenario (Shrink-ray likely vs "20% Free").
- Click Run, then compare simulated profit to analytic profit.
- Use "Set Q to argmax" to see what quantity the model prefers for your settings.
Transparency note: the simulation uses the same buy rules as the tutorial, sampled from uniform distributions.
Analytics
alpha*D_i(Q) + (1-alpha)*D_u(P). In Strict mode, D_u is multiplied by 1{Q > Q*}.